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• Indeed, few would dispute the correctness of Bernstein's (1998,100) observation that Bernoulli's ' ...paper is one of the most profound documents ever written'. Besides those who specifically considered the paradox, the utility solution to the paradox is implicitly accepted by those who apply cardinal utility notions to problems of decision making under conditions ofrisk and uncertainty. This has produced a formidable body ofliterature 4 •
The 8t Petersburg Paradox has thus been enormously influential. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that contrary to the accepted view, the St Petersburg game does not lead to a paradox at all.
The St Petersburg Game
The background to the St Petersburg gameS is now 6 well-known and it is not I ¢ necessary to repeat it here in any detail. For ease of reference only a brief overview is given.
Attempts have been made for a long time to develop decision criteria to assist in the decision making process or to find theories 7 explaining why people make the decisions they do when facing conditions of risk and uncertainty. The earliest and most well-known criterion is the expected monetary value (EMV) criterion 8 , the formulation ofwhich is credited 9 to Pierre de Fermat (1601-1665) and Blaise Pascal (1623-1662). According to this criterion a person faced with this kind of decision would or should choose the path involving uncertainty, if it has the most advantageous EMV.
Daniel Bernoulli (1738) attempted to demonstrate that this criterion did not in fact explain the behaviour of a reasonable person lO under these circumstances.
He used a number of problems including the poor fellow problem and the 8t Petersburg game ll to support his hypothesis. He then went on to suggest an alternative theory. His new theory was based on the notion of marginal decreasing value of wealth 12 • This today, in its developed form is the expected utility value (EUY) criterion or expected utility value hypothesis.
The St Petersburg game goes like this. Peter offers Paul an opportunity to take part in a game of chance where a coin is flipped and ifa head appears (with an a priori probability of 112), Paul receives $1 (ie $2l) 13 . If it does not appear, the game continues. If the head appears after the second flip (with an a priori probability of 112 2 ), Paul receives $2 (ie $z1) and ifnot, the game continues in this fashion, until such time as a head appears (if ever) whereupon the game terminates and Paul can take his winnings. It is conceptually possible for any game to continue to infmity. The probability of the g a m e . t t i n g at the'iib flip ofthe coin is lIi with a corresponding payout of$zi·l.
The simple question to be answered is how much should, a reasonable person, the proverbial Paul be prepared to pay to play the game? As a rule-of-thumb, the answer should be of the same order as the EMV of the game l4
• From Bernoulli (1738) to Aase (2001) it has been accepted that the EMV of the game is infinite. In other words accepting the EMV as a rule-of-thumb guide, a reasonable man should be prepared to pay an exceptionally large sum to play the game.
The traditional derivation is as follows. 
that no reasonable person in the position of Paul will risk a substantial amount (let alone an infinite amount) to play the game. Numerous empirical l7 tests indicate that in general people will not risk more than $12 -$13 to play the game, and in the vast majority of cases a sum much less than this. Therein lies the paradox. The EMV predicts that a reasonable person should be prepared to risk a very large amount to play the game, and generally no fault can be found with the EMV decision criterion which is still the most widely used decision criterion and no-one can fault the reasonable person for not being prepared to risk a large ã o u n t to Iplay the g m e .
Both are seemingly correct and no completely satisfactory explanatIOn has been found to reconcile these contradictory conclusions -hence the apparent paradox.
it follows from series (1), (2) and equation (3) that, expressed in dollars, the EMV is determined as shown in Table 1 2 DETERMINING THE EMV THE ST PETERSBURG GAME or the EMV = Cf;J Table 1 Traditional solution of the St Petersburg game It will now be shown that the traditional determination of the EMV is only correct as a special case where the game is played an infmite number oftimes.
A single game
First, the position of a single game l9 is considered.
It seems to me the source of the paradox stems from the irrational assumption that the EMV can be applied equally when a large number of games are played or when a single game is played. This irrational assumption ignores the Law of Large Numbers. Since the EMV by defmition, is concerned with the average payouts of a number of games, the EMV is of little assistance when a single game is played 20 • A number of points about the traditional solution of the EMV should be noted.
The EMV is infmite because the series consists of an infmite number of terms each of constant value, in this example $Y2. The sum of this infmite series of fmite numbers is infinite An infinite amount can be an issue for another reason. As the game continues, the payouts become increasing large, tending to infinity. It is possible to confuse the infinity which comes from the sum of the series and infmity of a very large payout. These two infmities are more often than not confused. The paradox concerns Paul's decision vis-a-vis the EMV = not Paul's decision vis-a-vis fmal large payout. Even for very large payouts, according to the traditional derivationlS, the contribution of each of payouts to the EMV is still the same constant l6 .
Concluding that the EMV of the game is infmite, empirical evidence indicates hile it may seem hard to give justification for using probability statements when the event occurs only once ... the contrary position [that probability statements are irrelevant] also seems difficult to defend.' It is not the EMV which is important when playing a single game but the probability of the outcome. 
The EMV of M games
As indicated it is doubtful if the EMV is meaningful when only a single game is played so, multiple games are now considered. Multiple games must be considered for another reason. The issue is not only what is Paul prepared to pay for his ticket, but also what should Peter be prepared to accept to allow Paul to take part in the game. Logically if Paul is asked how much would he be prepared to pay to f.lay the game, his answer will be, 'As little as possiblepreferably nothing. Secondly the mere statement that M games will be played implies that all games do in fact terminate, ie that one of the M games does not continue to infmity. This accords with realityz4 and theoJiS. The fact that a game may go to infinity does not mean that a game does go to infinity. What is not known is where each or any of the M games end. Thirdly despite the fact that all the games end, no limit is placed on any single game. Particularly no limit is placed on the length of time that any game may lasf 6 or on the magnitude ofthe payout. If a game happens to go to infinity, Peter must live with that risk.
Once it is accepted that the games are played a multiple number of times, the mathematical nature of the problem becomes clear. Peter must fmd a way of determining the EMV of a series of terminating games, but the point of tennination is not known beforehand. If Peter is prepared to accept $8 per game, millions of Pauls may be prepared to play games for that amount. Will Peter be able to pay the millions of Pauls out of the $8 per game he is prepared to accept?
Once the problem is correctly stated, it is not difficult to solve. Assume the game is played M = 2 k times. Ifthis generalised approach is adopted then M (or k) can be varied from I to infinity. In this manner all possible numbers of games are catered for, including M = 00. The methodology for solving the problem was suggested by Bernoulli (1954 Bernoulli ( /1738 himself. The solution setout in this paper could have been arrived at in 1738. Bernoulli pointed out that the number of games (nj) which terminate at the first flip of the coin (first term) is Y2 of the total number of games piayed,Z7 and Y4 terminate at the second term and so on. In general if M games are played then the number terminating at term TI, T z , T 3 , •••T j '" is nj = pj.M. This number is then multiplied by the payout C j for that term and divided by the total number of games played, M. In this way the contribution of each individual term to the EMV is established. The various contributions are then summed to arrive at the EMV.
If the game is played 2 k times, the n u m b ẽ g of (n\) games which terminate after the first flip of the coin is \1'2 x 2 k or 2k -I. The payout for the first term (Td is $2 0. The number of (nz) games which terminates after the second flip, (T2) is l/i x 2 k or 2 k-Z with a payout of $2 \ and so the pattern continues until 2°is
reached. The results are shown in Table 2 . or for all practical purposes:
At the k th term (T0 the game has been played 2 k -1
This is a geometric progression the sum of which is 2 k • 1. In other words all games have terminated by the k th term, except one 29 , which had alreadro terminated at some point beyond the Tk term by the time M games had been played.
Ifthis solitary game ended at T(k+l) the payout is $2 k and the contribution to the EMV is ($2 k . 2 . k)=$I. Since all the 2 k games have now terminated all other terms in the series equals zero,. all the way to infmity. If the remaining game terminated at T(k+2) then the payout for this game is $2 k + 1 and the contribution to the EMV from this game is ($2 k + 1 • 2 -k) = $2. In this event the contribution from T(k+1) term is 0 as are all the other terms to infmity. Thus although terms beyond the k th term have both payouts 31 and a priori probabilities pi, the contribution from all of these except one, equals zero, since all games had ended. The contribution ofthis final game, to the EMV depends on its position after the k th term.
Thus using a priori 32 probabilities when the St Petersburg game is played 2 k times it produces, with certainty a series consisting of not more than k+1 terms, with the series terminating beyond the k th term. If played a finite number of times, a fmite, not infinite series is produced. The probability ofthere being less than k terms is thus zero. After the Tk term the series can terminate at any term to infmity. However each term beyond T k requires an additional flip ofthe coin, with a probability of Y2. The probability thus of the term ending after the Tk term, decreases at the rate Y2 . . In other words the probability of terminating at Tk+l is 1/2 at T k +2 is 114, at Tk+3 is 1/8, at or beyond the k+4 is 1/16, adding 1,2,
EMV(Zk)",+ 8
at a 93.7 per cent confidence level. 2 The St Petersburg game thus does not have a single a priori value for the EMV.
It has a series of possible EMVs starting at k/2 + 1 and continuing to infmity with decreasing probabilities. Of course for any specified number of games, the empirical EMV will have only one value determined by the above equation.
The traditional solution EMV = 00 is correct but only where the 8t Petersburg game is played an infinite number oftimes.
Many people may, subconsciously if nothing else, hold the view that the EMV, is the aggregate of the payouts divided by the number of games played (M), in the limit, when M approaches infinity. In terms of this view there is only one EMV and that is the value derived when the numbers of games tend to infinity. Those who hold this view will then hold that the traditional solution to the St Petersburg game that the EMV is infmity is correct by definition. There is no problem with this view but it still does not produce a paradox. One must compare apples with apples. If the assumption is that the game is played an infinite number oftimes, then it must be accepted that Paul can play the game an infinite number of times. In other words the question is 'Paul plays the 8t Petersburg game an infinite number of times, how much should he be prepared to wager per game to do so?' The answer to this question is quite correctly an infinite amount. IS not r ẽ U l r e d to explain the behaviour of Paul-he has during all these centunes been qUIte rational after all.
One cannot compare apples with pears. It clear that the traditional question is irrational if stated as, 'Paul plays the game a finite number of times (M), why does he not wager a substantial amount to play the game?' The answer is of course because he is only playing the game a finite number of times. In the traditional formulation of the paradox, the assumption is that Paul plays the game only once but then uses the EMV of an infinite number of games. It is not comparing apples with apples.
Returning to the above example. Assume Paul decides he will play one game for $8. Should Peter accept the wa §er? Peter needs to know how many other games will be played at his casin0 3 • Assume he accepts the $8 from all the Pauls and estimates that during the next fmancial year his casino will play 2 20 (ie 1 048576) games. The question now is, will he face a loss at the end ofthe year from all of these games? The EMV of these games 34 is $10+($1 or $2 or $4 or $8) ie within realistic confidence limits from $11 to $18. The first point to note is that whatever figure is chosen it is a modest amount, nowhere near the say $IOm or more required by the traditional solution to the St Petersburg game. The second point is using a priori probabilities Peter faces certainty that the EMV will not be less than $11. In other words if he accepted $8 from all the Pauls he would have lost not less than $3 per game or a total certain loss of not less than $3 146328 pa. What Peter should have charged was not less than k/2 + A. or $18 to be 93.75 per cent confident that he would not suffer a loss.
CONCLUSION
So it is easy to answer the question, 'How much should the reasonable man, Paul, be prepared to pay to play the St Petersburg game?' Paul would simply respond, 'How many times am I allowed to play the game?' If the answer is twice he would answer, 'An amount in the order of $1/1 + $8 = $9.' If the answer is that he can play the game 2 18 times he would answer, 'An amount in the order of$9 + $8 =$17.' It will be noted that although the number of games increase substantially, the size ofPaul's wager does not. In all cases the amount the EMV, once correctly determined, predicts that his wager is moderate and this is in accordance with common experience. If the answer is that he can play an infmite number of games, his answer would be that he would wager an infinite amount.
The correct determination of the EMV does not thus expect Paul to wager an infmite amount to playa fmite number of games, nor would a reasonable person do so. The EMV once correctly derived for the St Petersburg game does not lead to a paradox at all -it never did. The application of the EMV criterion gives an answer that is consistent with the behaviour of the reasonable man. Bernoulli's article appeared in St Petersburg. Savage (1972: 93) ascn?es theã m e to the journal in which Bernoulli's paper was first publIshed. Shght variations in the name are encountered. Some writers such as Keynes (1973 Keynes ( /1921 refer to the paradox as the Petersburg paradox. I say now because until Samuelson (1977) set-out its history this had not really been done or as Samuelson put it '... I found to my surprise that no one seems to have provided anything like a complete survey of the subject.' Earlier writers in particular Todhunter (1865) provided at least an outline ofthe subject.
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The theory could have more than one emphasis. It can for example attempt to explain the behaviour of people when faced with decisions involving uncertainty or be a management tool to assist in making an appropriate decision. 8 The EMV is derived as follows. If a game of chance is played M times and has a range of possible outcomes C b C 2 , C 3 ... CM then the Friedman and Savage (1948) for the use of income instead ofwealth. 13 The original currency was the ducat, which Bernstein (1998: 106) equates to about $40 today. In principle the type of currency is irrelevant. This paper uses dollars.
14 It is accepted that the typical gambler would be prepared to pay an amount in excess ofthe mathematical expectation ofa game ofchance. 15 There is a further problem with the traditional solution. In the limit as the payouts tend to infinity and the probability of these large payout tends to zero and the contributions from this point onwards, strictly speaking become which is 1/2 n-l . 2 n or 0.4 which is indeterminate and not a constant. 16 Assume for example the game continues to a payout of i oo an enormous amount. The probability of this happening is 2-101 and hence, according to the traditional view the contribution of this term is still only Y2. The size ofthe fmal payout is irrelevant in the determination ofthe EMV. 17 I have often explained the game to students and asked them to indicate the amount they would be prepared to risk to play the game. No student is ever prepared to risk more than a few dollars to play the game. Despite going to great lengths to explain the game I doubt if every student understood the explanation since some students indicate that zero is a reasonable amount to play the game. Since the lowest amount to be won is $1, it is clear that those students did not comprehend the game. This is almost invariably the answer I get from at least one student when I ask a class of students the question, 'How much would you be prepared to pay to play one round ofthe St Petersburg game?' 23 I say only one because if it goes to infmity it never ends and thus the next game in the series will never be played. 24 I simulated St Petersburg games millions upon millions of times; all ended. An academic commenting on an earlier draft of this paper simulated the game a billion times; all ended. In practice the games end. Many writers think that time is a factor which limits the game. It is not clear why they believe that time is an issue. In order to win $2 10°, only 98 tails in a row would be required, even ifplayed manually this game would take less than five minutes to complete.
Bernoulli confused matters slightly by saying an infmite number of games are played. This being so Karl Menger, in footnote 10 in Bernoulli's (1954/1738) paper correctly pointed out that it is not possible to divide infinity by Y2 or a Y4 etc.
Strictly speaking, n i is the ' ... probable number of times that the game terminates...' The implications of this statement must be understood. If the game is played 2 k times it is certain that there will be 2 k_ 1 games all of which terminate by the kth term. In other words the idea that the St Petersburg game continues to infinity is not only wrong in practice it is wrong in theory. Only one game can continue beyond the kth term. The game which terminates beyond the Tk term could be anyone of the M games. By the time the last game is played, the game which survives beyond the T k term is almost certain to have long already have ended. The idea that the last game which is played will also somehow be the game which continues to infinity can be dismissed as a statistical improbability. The fact that all terms have a payout is relevant to Menger's superparadoxes (see Samuelson (1977». It does not matter what values are assigned to the payouts if n i is zero. Neither the a priori probabilities nor payouts matter ifall games have ended.
It is possible to simulate the games in which event ni will only approximate pi .M. In this case it is possible to get more or less than one game terminating beyond Tk. It is not unusual that the two parties to a transaction involving risk are in a different position. A person seeking insurance for his house faces a low frequency of the destruction of his house, say 1/10000 per annum. Most insureds will not in their lifetime experience a total loss. The insurer on the other hand which insures say 1 000 000 houses, faces a virtual certainty that at least more than one insured house will be destroyed each year and more likely than not 100 houses a year will be destroyed.
Derived from the formula developed in this paper. 
